A sunset law on sanctions?

In an earlier post on whether the Democrats should announce a detailed plan for Iraq before the elections, I advocated the prior necessity of affirming a number of basic principles in international relations on which the two major parties sometimes differ. One of these was the value of sustained interaction even with nations we disagree with. The breaking off of diplomatic relations and the imposition of economic sanctions are both ways of expressing displeasure that are useful in the short term but may create insoluble problems for the future. The difficulty is simply this: even when it is clear that increasing contact is necessary to improving relations, politicians may be uncomfortable advocating contact before that improvement occurs. Courage would be one solution. But failing that, how to provide cover for the lifting of sanctions or resumption of relations that may lead to improvement?

Sunset provisions have become fairly common in legislation. Most legislation is intended to stand indefinitely, but the occasional repeal or reform of existing legislation is inevitable and there is probably too much on the books. Because laws often have paradoxical or unanticipated consequences, some legislation should actually be regarded as experimental and explicitly designated for review. Republicans like sunset laws as a way of limiting the proliferation of regulations and agencies, but both parties may turn to them in the search for supporting votes — a pill is less bitter if it goes down fast. Various tax cuts are now approaching expiration unless the Congress votes to extend them, and permitting that expiration, thus restoring the previous situation, may be politically safer than adjusting taxes to make them more equitable. At the same time, extending sunset limits allows dealing piecemeal with portions of an original balanced package.

Interestingly, the Republican liking for sunset laws is balanced by a Democratic liking for trade sanctions. Democrats tend to see sanctions as a way of applying pressure to persuade nations (South Africa during apartheid or, more recently, Burma) to change policies that are only indirectly related to trade, but worry that over time they cause more problems for ordinary people than for decision making elites. Republicans see them as a constraint of trade causing losses to U.S. business. The record suggests that the influence of sanctions is limited and is primarily expressive, but this does not mean they lack influence. It does mean that sanctions may have side effects that are undesirable even though they are a useful expression of international opinion, which does influence policy. Republicans seem more likely to regard specific regimes as intrinsically evil, where Democrats are more likely to believe that interaction and exchange can have a positive influence — that like individuals, nations and even regimes can learn.

In effect, both parties have divided views about both the use of economic sanctions and the use of sunset provisions that have to do with deep philosophical differences. This is complicated by constitutional issues between the President and Congress, the role of the UN, and the efforts of local governments (states and municipalities) to have their own foreign policies.

It is becoming increasingly clear that progress toward settlement in Iraq requires conversation with Iran and Syria and that progress in the Israeli-Palestine conflict requires conversation with Hamas. Conversations and exchange with Cuba have been banned for almost fifty years and seem to be on hold for Castro’s death. Iran has made overtures and been rebuffed. These are high risk topics for politicians. The whole pattern of selectively breaking off diplomatic and trade relations is reminiscent of school yard politics, yet it all too easily seems to become engraved in stone.

So here is a simple proposal: enact legislation that would put a time limit on economic sanctions. In my previous post I suggested three years, but perhaps four or five would be more appropriate — enough to put the renewal or extension of sanctions into a subsequent administration. Where constitutional language might be deemed to limit the effect of such legislation (foreign policy is supposed to reside with the executive branch), the legislation could focus on enforcement funding and require periodic debate. If nothing else, such legislation would affirm the principle that on this small planet enmity is episodic and temporary and we are all fundamentally connected with each other.